I
argued in my previous post that the traditional model of relations between Ministers
and officials was unrealistic in the modern world.
So
what is the alternative?
Bringing
in the odd special adviser or technical specialist is not enough. There aren’t enough SpAds and there never
will be. Anyway, their role is
firefighting and obstacle-clearing, not complex policy design. Equally, specialists recruited from outside
government often find it hard to work as policy officials. It takes them time to adjust to the
risk-aversion of government or to the fact that subject expertise often takes
second place to political needs.
Instead,
our system needs to evolve more significantly.
I therefore recommend two reforms.
First, normalise movement in and out
of the system. Not at the margin but as
the norm. The UK is fortunate in having
a conglomeration of think tanks, professional advisers, academics, and experts
in all fields that is second to only the US.
Few of the people who work in them would think of spending a spell in
government except, occasionally, as a specially recruited political
adviser. That is a real loss.
Instead,
we should make it easy for experts to come in and out of government in much
larger numbers. We should actively expect
rotation of senior officials and advisers into and out of the bureaucracy when a
new government comes in, probably for fixed but renewable terms, precisely
because they are subject experts and because they have sympathy with the
political goals of the government. As governments
changed, this would happen again. Over time
the higher reaches of outside organisations would be peopled with individuals who
understood the realities of working in government and might yet have that
experience again.
Some
will argue this is not consistent with Northcote-Trevelyan. But that train has left the station. There already are outsiders in government, at
all levels, not recruited through the civil service entrance exam. There just aren’t enough of them to make a
difference and they have to operate in an culture shaped by the permanent officials. Bringing in a critical mass of such people,
with executive authority, would dramatically change the mood in government and
the incentives on officials.
Second, designate certain senior
official roles as “public-facing” and requiring a confirmation process before
the relevant Parliamentary Select Committee.
This would include permanent secretaries, probably DGs (the next grade
down), specific professional roles such as chief economist or chief scientist,
and a significant subset at least of ambassadors. Such confirmation would be needed whether the
incumbent was a permanent official or an outsider brought in. Procedural rules could be devised to ensure
that confirmation processes did not drag out like the US system. The point here is that such officials could
be questioned about political and party political realities and their own views
about them. They’d have to have the
confidence of their Minister in doing so (or else they wouldn’t be proposed or
would fail confirmation) but once endorsed they would share in the Minister’s
legitimacy to speak publicly on controversial issues, to make a case, and even
to take decisions on Ministers’ behalf.
Both
these reforms would go in the same direction – to have capable and intelligent
people running our government, but people who are not committed for life to a
subordinate bureaucratic role. Both
reforms would help us manage the reality that such relatively expert officials
would have views and perspectives of their own.
That
is an important point. I don’t believe you
can reasonably expect intelligent people to restrain their judgements, to do
things they believe are mistaken, to suspend their own judgement in favour of
others – just because Ministers tell them to.
The whole of the rest of society encourages people to speak up, to say
what you think, to be true to your convictions.
What I am recommending goes with this grain, while managing it and using
it for Ministers’ and the system’s best advantage.
Martin
Donnelly is right to say that under current arrangements officials develop
ironic detachment as a defence mechanism distancing themselves from things they
are asked to do. But that’s not a good
thing. There are few other organisations
where that would be seen as a desirable quality in employees. Lear’s Fool is scarcely a good model for good
administration.
No comments:
Post a comment